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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

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
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[Vietnam: There have been no major Communist-initiated military actions in the past few days, and most indications point toward only scattered, small-scale attacks in the near future.

There is growing evidence that the Communists are putting greater long-term emphasis on the use of guerrilla tactics, and of accompanying political action, throughout much of South Vietnam. This development often is consuming assets which previously had been used in main force, large-unit warfare.

Prisoners and captured documents reflect widespread efforts to upgrade Viet Cong guerrilla activities and to rely more heavily on sapper units both now and in future offensive periods. There are some reports of personnel transfers from main force units downward into local and guerrilla units. Recent reports from areas around Saigon indicate that allied pre-emptive operations have made use of regular infantry tactics virtually impossible for the Communists without unacceptable losses to their forces. Most sources suggest the enemy does not intend to press main force warfare in the immediate Saigon vicinity.

This shift in Communist tactics in South Vietnam may be an outgrowth of an evolving Hanoi strategy which evidently calls for a sharp decline in the number of replacements coming from North Vietnam during the next few months at least. Greater use of guerrilla warfare could help to reduce personnel losses during this period and still maintain a credible Communist military threat.

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[REDACTED]

Communist China: "War preparations" have become a major domestic propaganda theme in recent months but there are no signs that the Chinese are making efforts at military mobilization.

Peking apparently continues to believe that the recent border incidents with the Soviets justify giving high priority to military preparedness, but the regime's propaganda has been restrained and stops short of creating war hysteria. Moreover, many aspects of the war readiness propaganda are obviously designed to further important domestic goals. Appeals to prepare for war are repeatedly linked to the need to restore political unity and discipline, to stimulate industrial and agricultural production, and to restrict consumer consumption.

Radiobroadcasts from provinces in the border regions are predictably most alarmist regarding the Soviet threat. Heilungkiang radio recently went so far as to cite "Soviet revisionism" as China's "principal and most dangerous enemy." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] tell of scattered mass meetings where preparedness is invoked against the Soviet threat, but they indicate that there is no talk of carrying the attack to the enemy, no evidence of general air raid drills, and only isolated mention of shelter building. [REDACTED] cite consumer rationing, restrictions on taking leave, and the levy of a ten-percent grain tax in rural areas as measures of war preparedness.

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[REDACTED] suggest that the central leadership may be preparing to place more emphasis on national defense industries and perhaps has reached agreement to strengthen certain branches of the armed forces. There is little evidence to support this speculation, although Premier Chou En-lai reportedly delivered a speech after the ninth party congress in which he gave first priority to defense-related production.

At this stage, Peking appears to be preparing primarily for an extended period of heightened tension with Moscow rather than for any imminent Soviet military action. [REDACTED]

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USSR: The effect of lunar mass concentrations--called mascons--may have been a contributing factor in the crash of Luna 15 following an attempt at what apparently was to have been a soft landing.

The spacecraft almost certainly deviated from its planned trajectory during its orbital flight due to irregularities in the force of the moon's gravity caused by mascons. Mascons--discovered by US scientists less than a year ago--are large masses of dense material at or near the lunar surface which disturb the path of objects in lunar orbit. These orbital perturbations are cumulative, increasing with each succeeding revolution.

The Soviets may not have anticipated the magnitude of the problem despite published US concern. They may be able to use the information collected as a result of the Luna 15 mission, however, to allow planning for future flights using orbits similar to those of Luna 15.

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El Salvador - Honduras: Delegates to the OAS foreign ministers meeting are convening this afternoon in a less than optimistic mood.

【Seventeen foreign ministers are attending the first session, but their governments had hesitated to support the meeting with high-level representation, and many apparently will decline to collaborate in the formation of an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Although Mexico is sending its foreign minister, it would have preferred the OAS meeting on a level below cabinet rank, since the resolutions coming out of the meeting are likely to be punitive. Brazilian Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto is not planning to attend today's meeting. The authoritative Jornal Do Brazil quotes foreign office sources to the effect that Magalhaes may attend later sessions depending on developments.】

The Costa Rican foreign minister is attending,

Honduras remains tense, and a leader of the opposition Liberal Party claims that unless Salvadoran forces have withdrawn or an IAPF has been committed by 27 July, Honduras will launch an all-out attack to drive the enemy troops out.

believes that El Salvador will renew armed attacks. In Tegucigalpa unsigned flyers are urging President Lopez to fight again. Criticism of the Lopez government for inaction against the occupation appears to be gaining momentum.

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[REDACTED]

In El Salvador, government-controlled broadcasts continue to stress anti-Honduran propaganda but have softened attacks against the OAS. Privately owned radio stations, however, continue to exhort the government not to accede to OAS pressure. The Mexican foreign minister has information that President Sanchez fears that some of his hawkish military officers would refuse to obey orders to evacuate Honduran territory.

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Italy: The right-wing Socialists yesterday rejected Premier Rumor's effort to re-form a Christian Democratic-Socialist coalition, thus prolonging the government crisis. President Saragat may now ask the Christian Democrats to form a minority government alone. That party's left wing may make difficulties, however, since it--unlike the party majority--wants left-wing Socialists in any new government even if the right-wing Socialist party still refuses to participate.

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